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We are in desperate need of an EU Energy Policy.  
The facts are that, yes, there is indeed an EU Energy Policy. It is a policy based on a vision, a vision 
with three components. The policy is aiming for “markets, competition and efficiency”, it is equally 
focussing on “a sustainable energy economy”, and thirdly, it wants to “secure the EU’s energy 
supply”. 
Three objectives, three separate action lines. Balancing the three objectives in an integrated approach 
is challenging and difficult. To what extent is the market approach consistent with the other two policy 
packages? What impact does a climate package with tradable emission rights and non-tradable targets 
for green energy have on the market designs for gas and electricity? Are the necessary investments in 
new pipes and wires for securing our energy supplies sufficiently coming under the prevailing 
regulatory framework? Or, to put it differently; are we smart enough in the way in which we are 
making implementing steps in order to meet our stated objectives?  
Our paper ends with a proposed new vision and a set of 22 recommendations to the new European 
Commission. 
Keywords 
Energy policy; climate change; security of energy supply; EU internal market 
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The Clingendael International Energy Programme (CIEP), the Loyola de Palacio Programme of the 
European University Institute, the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and Wilton Park (WP) 
organised a four-tier project to discuss the potential for a smart EU Energy Policy. The project 
consisted of three workshops where academics discussed the various interactions between the three 
core objectives of EU energy policy with stakeholders from governments, regulators, and industry. 
Following the three workshops a conference took place to examine the workshop reports and to 
formulate overall project conclusions and recommendations. The objective of the project was to come 
out with a set of “smart” conclusions and recommendations for the 2010 EU energy policy review. 
The deliberations at the four project meetings greatly informed the views expressed in this document, 
but those views belong to the authors only and do not necessarily represent those of individual 
participants at the meetings or of the four supporting organisations. 
I. Introduction 
We are in desperate need of an EU Energy Policy. Outcries for it come from press reports, especially 
when something is happening (again) for instance with East-West gas flows. Apparently, the EU is 
either lacking such a policy, or is not adequately communicating it.  Or maybe another question comes 
up: is it smart enough? The facts are that, yes, there is  indeed an EU Energy Policy. It is a policy 
based on a vision, a vision with three components. The policy is aiming for “markets, competition and 
efficiency”, it is equally focussing on “a sustainable energy economy”, and thirdly, it wants to “secure 
the EU’s energy supply”. From a historic point of view, one could even argue that finally, after some 
50 years since its inception, we have one, as the European Council agreed in the spring of 2007 on 
such a three-tier approach.  
Formulating the policy is one thing. Starting to work on implementing paths, as well as developing 
policy instruments and legislative frameworks, is the next and more difficult one. On “the market”, a 
comprehensive 3
rd Energy market package was developed. On “the climate” a comparably challenging 
Green Package was agreed upon. And on “supply security” a rather fragmented 2
nd Strategic Energy 
Review was put on the table. In addition, the Commission has indicated that “the EU needs to begin 
preparing its energy future in the longer term” and that “the Commission will therefore propose to 
renew the Energy Policy for Europe in 2010 with a view to charting a policy agenda for 2030 and a 
vision for 2050, to be supported by a new Action Plan”.  
Three objectives, three separate action lines. Balancing the three objectives in an integrated 
approach is challenging and difficult. To what extent is the market approach consistent with the other 
two policy packages? What impact does a climate package with tradable emission rights and non-
tradable targets for green energy have on the market designs for gas and electricity? Are the necessary 
investments in new pipes and wires for securing our energy supplies sufficiently coming under the 
prevailing regulatory framework? Or, to put it differently; are we smart enough in the way in which 
we are making implementing steps in order to meet our stated objectives? 
II. EU Energy Policy reconsidered 
It is useful to reflect briefly on EU energy policy per se before the outcomes of the three workshops 
are discussed and a number of recommendations for a smart EU Energy Policy are proposed.     
EU energy policy is basically a basket of a number of policies that are concerned with energy 
markets and energy issues. It did not come from the member states, nor did it emerge as an integrated 
concept from the Commission. It did not come from the energy sector either, a sector that traditionally 
is one of the most conservative ones in the EU. What the EU did agree upon in its 2007 Spring 
Council was the adoption of “three mantras” as a basis for a variety of policy and regulatory proposals Jean-Michel Glachant, Robert Grant, Manfred Hafner, and Jacques de Jong 
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and actions. Three mantra’s, “Kyoto, Lisbon and Moscow”, covering the issues of climate  change, 
competitiveness and supply security. Let’s look at them separately. 
On Kyoto, the green issue. It was built upon the fact that energy related environmental issues 
became in the late 1980’s a truly European domain to fight acid rain and to save migrant birds and 
fish. When Kyoto happened, the EU adopted it, as earlier attempts to start an EU carbon tax failed 
dramatically. The EU’s leadership produced two surprises , one to translate Kyoto rather overnight 
into a market based system, i.e. the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). The other one, launched 
without very much analytical basis so it appeared almost as some kind of “gift from heaven”, was 
about long term (i.e. burdening successors) non-binding common “political” targets in the form of the 
‘Triple Twenties’ for 2020.  
On Lisbon, the market issue. Lisbon was born in 1986 when the European Community enacted its 
project to create a Common Market by 1992.. The Single Act for the Internal Market was core 
business for the EEC, the Economic Community. The goal was to have market based economies with 
no internal barriers to trade, and a centralised monitoring system to review progress and to solve 
ongoing discrepancies. Energy was included in the plans, but made very slow progress due to the 
domination of national monopolies with their strong national government ties and behaviours 
(including with strategic national interests, rightly or wrongly) and many cross-subsidisations 
throughout the value chain. Many battles emerged with UK market-led Thatcherite approaches. Two 
steps were taken during 1990-1991 on cross border transits in gas and electricity, followed in 1996 to 
1998 with a first liberalisation package. Market liberalisation gained momentum in 2003 with a more 
comprehensive second package, and then a third one in 2009 that is probably not the final word.  
On Moscow, the security of supplies. Russian energy (gas) supplies played an increasingly 
important role for the EU since the early 1980’s. The peaceful dissolution of the Soviet empire gave 
opportunities for energy cooperation initiated in some national capitals and hence not applauded in 
Brussels. The question for Brussels was how to react in the absence of a formal role. The foreign 
policy dimension was very political and energy was not on the radar screens. The reaction from 
Berlaymont was to sell the internal market paradigm to the East ., an approach that met with some 
success except in Moscow. Market opening was not in Russia’s interest, whereas maximising producer 
rents in the value chain was. After the Commission’s several attempts from the 1960’s onwards to start 
“une politique communautaire d’approvisionnement énergetique”, including the severely defeated 
initiative of its Vice President Loyola de Palacio in 2003, the 2005 “winter energy panic” in London, 
and the 2006 Ukrainian gas crisis, the creation of an EU Energy Policy combining Kyoto, Lisbon and 
Moscow suddenly emerged.     
Looking now somewhat closer at the three cornerstones, Lisbon, Kyoto and Moscow, and their 
respective interrelations, we note the following.    
II-a The Lisbon dimension 
A competitive energy market requires by definition pro-competitive regulation and pro-competitive 
industry structures. Although directives have been agreed upon and stringent compliance policy is 
developing with respect to national implementation, member states are free to go further than the 
requirements in the directives or to provide further details and refinements. This is putting further 
pressures on the harmonisation process as the devil is always in the detail. The same observation 
applies to the role of the National Regulatory Authorities (NRA’s), which basically have a national 
focus that does not always allow looking at cross-border issues in the wider EU interest. The more 
concrete and important actions for crossing borders are found in EU Regulations. They are, however, 
still under control of the member states due to the time consuming and complicated comitology-
process with its qualified majority loading. Industry restructuring can only take place in the context of 
the EU’s Competition Policy when mergers and acquisitions are on the table or when competition 
cases (“smoking guns”) are at stake.  Toward a Smart EU Energy Policy: Rationale and 22 Recommendations 
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In the Lisbon-Moscow relationship, the Competitive Internal Energy Market is the core of the 
policy, also determining the EU’s external security of supply (SoS) policy! There is no doubt on that. 
But beyond that statement there is silence and a lack of concrete visions and strategies. Are we really 
to believe that open and friendly international markets will deliver timely and sufficient upstream 
infrastructures to ship the gas we think we need? And what about liquefied natural gas (LNG) and 
terminals? And what about our internal needs for expanding infrastructure in gas and electricity, 
including the wider dimensions of “ring” concepts and super-grids? And therefore, is there a need  for 
a full rethink and an entirely redefined approach?  
Similar thoughts are coming up for Lisbon and Kyoto, where we see already right now that heavily 
subsidised renewable energy sources (RES) are complicating and even damaging grid operation and 
the functioning of the market. Will further massive RES deployment put even stronger pressure on the 
rest of the EU energy markets and grid management?    
II-b The Kyoto dimension 
The CO2 market needs to be tightened and harmonised across the EU to be effective. This calls for a 
strong and centrally regulated EC role, including effective monitoring and a centralised auctioning 
process. This is probably unfeasible with Member states (MS) comitology, as at least one argument 
relates to the fiscal sovereignty paradigm. Further calls for a carbon tax or even emission performance 
standards are adding to the debate. Massive RES requires a strong effort to “squeeze” actual EU RES 
potentials, which can only deliver when there is open access to all EU RES resources and an open and 
integrated EU RES market. Today’s RES policy is still however completely nationalised and 
politicised by national capitals. The 2020 “three twenties” targets require strong EU deployment of 
advanced low/zero carbon technologies. On the road towards “2050” strong innovation push and pull 
programmes are necessary, not only requiring massive investments but even more so stable and 
effective regulatory regimes.  
Kyoto and Lisbon. Basically the CO2 market is working in a satisfactory way, but uncertainties 
remain as to the longer-term assurances of the price of carbon in relation to massive investment needs 
in RES, energy efficiency and low/zero carbon technologies. RES policy is not working at all; national 
dreams prevail and are blindly subsidised, pushing efficient RES deployment out of the market. Kyoto 
is frustrating Moscow as RES is discouraging upstream investment in gas that is still needed for 
decades to come. Supply security is therefore not well coordinated with demand security. RES and 
“clean development mechanisms” (CDM) could be frankly used as a lever in EU foreign policy. Is that 
an option, and if so how? 
II-c The Moscow dimension 
Our external SoS policy is focussed on “embedding” foreign economies in the large, peaceful EU 
internal market. But what happens if foreigners do not jump in? What will the EU reaction be? Is there 
a “no policy” EU policy? EU external SoS policy has NO infrastructure development plan and NO 
energy long term contracting framework to make deals with foreigners. We are good at wording EU 
external policy, but lack concrete means and instruments.  
Moscow and Lisbon. There is no doubt that the EU external SoS policy has been supportive of the 
internal market in the past, notably by suppressing gas destination clauses. But today the content is 
mainly “endless speeches” and the Commission cannot sign any energy contract. Having no clear 
vision on infrastructure development and long term contracting policy does not help the internal 
market. The EU SoS external policy cannot end in a “Nabucco only” game.   
Moscow and Kyoto may be moving in the direction of making at least solar RES and CDM as well 
as gas a core part of EU SoS with Mediterranean countries.  Jean-Michel Glachant, Robert Grant, Manfred Hafner, and Jacques de Jong 
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III. The first workshop  
Discussion was held on the internal energy market design and its consequences for energy supply 
security and climate change policies. In three concluding sessions the workshop focused on: 
1.  The interaction of market design and cross border issues with climate change policy components: 
•  On ETS: a single exchange scheme all over Europe will remove an important cause of possible 
cross-border problems, but the resulting change of the merit order might introduce changes in 
power flows due to differences in energy mixes, making grid issues more salient. 
•  On RES: keeping the balance between exposing them to the market while protecting them from 
excessive market risks would allow their development in line with efficient balancing in the 
short run and efficient location in the long run.  
•  On other low-carbon technologies: as there is no single technology policy, interdependencies 
through interconnected grids bring the risk that cross-subsidies can emerge, with consequences 
not only for economic transfer between countries but also and more importantly for efficient 
operation and investment in the power sector. 
2.  The interaction of market design and cross border issues with power supply security, generation 
investment and transmission infrastructures, with general consensus on: 
•  The theoretical superiority of day-ahead, intraday and real time nodal pricing for short run 
efficient scarcity and locational pricing. In the long run, indicative planning on generation 
adequacy and transmission developments are needed to help coordination of investments. 
•  The need and the role of long term contracts for efficient generation investment, but questions 
about the need for capacity markets are still unclear.  
•  The existence of institutional obstacles for efficient cross border system balancing. Progress is 
however being made, including developments in the direction of a limited number of 
coordination centres, regional market couplings and coordination of power exchanges and 
wholesale markets. These developments could further result in European markets closer to pool 
models.   
3.  The interaction of market design and cross-border issues with “gas supply security”, gas imports, 
infrastructure and transits: 
•  There is an increasing need for more cross border transits in the gas network, which means 
either a higher rate of utilization or new gas network infrastructure. This infrastructure can bring 
high value to the gas system through the management of uncertainty, promoting competition and 
leading to a more efficient gas market. 
•  Present remunerations for gas networks via systems of regulated tariffs are not giving the right 
incentives for further development. In addition, the current duration of regulatory periods (3 to 5 
years) are not adapted to investments with long-term lifespans.  
•  The European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the national 
regulators should create a framework where long term contracts for gas transmission can emerge 
with a limited size for entry-exit areas and with stability of tariffs as the best incentives for 
transmission system operators (TSO’s) to invest. 
IV. The second workshop  
A closer look was taken at the Green Package approach and its consequences for internal energy 
market design and the implementation of the 2nd Strategic Energy Review.  In wrapping-up, ideas 
were expressed that could be considered as useful inputs into the overall reporting on the project: Toward a Smart EU Energy Policy: Rationale and 22 Recommendations 
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1.  On RES, four issues are particularly noteworthy: 
•  There is a need to address new business models for TSO’s, given their impact on policy and 
regulatory agendas. 
•  The policies of “feed-in-tariffs” could generally be considered as success stories, but some final 
“wait-and-see” views were expressed as well. 
•  The development of a “green market” for electricity, such as Guarantee of Origin systems and 
Renewable Energy certification, is loaded with uncertainties and could be further explored.  
•  There is huge potential within the EU for the deployment of bio-energy and biofuels, but an 
integrated policy is necessary linking agriculture, trade, energy and environment. The European 
policy umbrella on agriculture could be a strong advantage in promoting bio-energy. 
4.  On fuel mix, an EU vision and strategy seems appropriate, but questions were raised about the 
viability of an overall EU policy. Since many member states lack comprehensive policies on their 
national fuel mix, an integrated  EU policy seems to be out of reach. Looking at developments 
within national energy systems, however, the role of natural gas seems to remain or will become a 
key element.   
5.  On ETS, the point of no return has been reached, but more clarity is needed for the post 2012 
longer-term framework. Industry in particular is sending the message that ETS in its current form 
is insufficient to drive an energy transition and change the fuel mix in Europe. ETS as such is 
necessary but not sufficient, and complementary policies are needed, such as a system of Emission 
Performance Standards (EPS).  
6.  With respect to ACER, the basic structure has been defined, although some question marks still 
remain. One of the key observations is that successful implementation will strongly depend on the 
“regulatory behaviour” and cooperativeness of NRA’s. Secondly, the TSO’s are quite active in 
using their early-mover’s advantage to influence regulation through the European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), established in December 2008.  
7.  On regional issues, more focus and attention on the development of regional markets seems to be 
necessary, including effective EU mechanisms on assuring coherence and consistency.  
V. The third workshop  
The Strategic Energy Review (SER) and its consequences for internal energy market design and Green 
Package policies were examined. Discussions brought out the following views: 
1.  EU energy scenarios, security of supply and climate change, and EU future gas import 
requirements. European policy risks sending mixed messages to gas producers. On the one hand 
they are asked to make the necessary longer term investments in gas, on the other hand the Green 
Targets are attempting to reduce gas demand. If investments are not made and if the targets are not 
met, there is a risk of medium term supply crunches. Smart EU policy requires: 
•  A more coherent and credible EU approach that uses its scenarios for consultations with 
producer countries and market participants.  
2.  The external energy dimension, the role of Russia and the Caspian for EU gas supplies, require 
smart policies: 
•  To be producer focused, acknowledging that maturity of reserves is at the basis of any 
hydrocarbon value chain, with access to acreage and resources being a key concern and a 
challenge; 
•  To provide an adaptive market based competitive framework for commercialisation of gas that 
allows interface management between producer resource policies and the EU’s internal energy 
market; and Jean-Michel Glachant, Robert Grant, Manfred Hafner, and Jacques de Jong 
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•  To provide an incentive based framework for phased transits and transportation, with project 
interdependency and focus on timely delivery of effective and transparent solutions.  
3.  Internal gas and electricity market design, balancing security of supply versus competition: 
•  Integrate markets and enhance cross-border interconnections in gas and electricity 
infrastructure; 
•  Regulatory policies should promote investments in new gas and electricity infrastructure, 
including for storage and buffering; and 
•  A common regulatory basis is needed for cross border interconnections, and ACER should be 
given effective powers in order to contribute to the development of integrated EU energy 
markets.  
4.  The role of North Africa in terms of solar electricity supply to Europe, the Solar Plan and Desertec 
proposals: 
•  Join and combine the two political/business initiatives; 
•  Create a beneficial political and regulatory framework, including options for granting priority 
status under EU infrastructure projects; 
•  Open EU feed-in regulations for power from the deserts; 
•  Explore public/private partnerships; and 
•  Promote the development and operation of a European and trans-Mediterranean super-grid. 
5.  Smart EU Policies to promote carbon capture and storage (CCS) and nuclear: 
•  A viable EU-wide emission trading system capable of delivering standardised carbon prices 
and/or an effective EU wide carbon tax; and 
•  Nuclear power requires local political consent along with levelling the playing field for low-
carbon technologies, investor assurances with regard to licensing procedures, and the 
exploration of regional centres for high-level waste (HLW) disposal and clarifying the position 
of decommissioning funds. 
VI. The concluding conference 
During the concluding conference discussion focused on a number of critical issues that came out of 
the three workshops on the respective pillars. 
With respect to the internal market pillar, five key items were brought to the fore that need to be 
further assessed and reconciled: 
•  the use of long-term contracting;  It was noted that there is a barrier to market entry for 
newcomers, but these contracts are also essential for sharing risks throughout the value chain, 
particularly  in the gas market, and in a sense they do not differ from the long term feed-in-tariff 
systems for RES;  
•  the massive deployment of renewable energy; this will need a rebalancing of the costs of related 
infrastructure (also to be paid by generators), suggesting the use of nodal pricing arrangements; 
both TSO’s and distribution system operators (DSO’s) need incentives to contribute, and their 
role is set to change dramatically; 
•  the regional market initiatives; sufficient incentives are also needed to drive the cross-border 
investments that must underpin regional market integration; in addition market coupling, 
regionally coordinated balancing markets for gas and electricity, more pronounced roles for 
energy exchanges, and a more effective consistency mechanism are needed; issue of TSO cost-
sharing principles for cross border trade and transfers (such as the Inter-TSO Compensation 
mechanism for electricity) need to be finally solved; Toward a Smart EU Energy Policy: Rationale and 22 Recommendations 
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•  the role of the regulators; will ACER, heralded as one of the strongest agencies ever created by 
the EU, be able to meet the “high expectations” put on it?; as to guidelines and network codes,  
ACER is already lagging behind ENTSO-E with its expeditious work on guidelines and network 
codes;  
•  the necessary new investments in infrastructures; the Ten Year Network Development Plans 
from the ENTSO’s signify a milestone as a pan-European vision on the future of the two grids; 
but it also raises new questions: 
¾ are the ENTSO’s becoming the ‘deputy director’ of network construction? 
¾ is enough emphasis placed on the question of how to make the most cost-effective 
transmission infrastructure investments at both cross-border and national level, notably to 
accommodate more RES and to enhance (gas) supply security?  
¾ will the focus remain on the consumer and on competition principles or is there a need to shift 
towards supply security and sustainability?  
The impact of the Green Package policies and related issues were identified in the second session:  
•  a general view held that current RES policy focuses too much on electricity while half of energy 
consumption does not go into power generation. Energy efficiency, heat storage and cooling, 
biofuels, solar thermal and combined-heat-and-power (CHP) are relatively neglected.  
•  RES will have major impacts on grids, not only for electricity but also for gas as it increasingly 
becomes the prime flexibility source for managing intermittencies (including consequences for 
gas storage and gas market designs). 
•  smart grids and demand-side management are important initiatives, but in terms of time-scale 
and quantitative impact, will they match up against the intermittency issues expected from 
Europe’s RES policy?  
•  ‘bottom-up’ initiatives are crucial to meet sustainability objectives and top-down imposition 
might be counter-productive. If focusing on the objective of lowering emissions, there also 
appears to be a clear divergence between the price paid for reductions achieved in the RES 
domain and within ETS.  
•  ETS is functioning properly, but is so far only working to drive operational questions, not 
investment decisions. Uncertainty remains on longer-term carbon price developments. Yet the 
introduction of Emission Performance Standards (EPS) will interfere and take liquidity away 
from ETS, and is thus quite contested. 
•  Green Package policies are supporting sustainable supply security. There is an industrial case as 
well, but what if China becomes a key supplier of solar PV and wind turbines? We should 
recognize that for some MS RES means just shifting dependency from one country to another. 
Energy efficiency policies need to be much more focussed and strengthened. 
•  Governments should not pick low carbon “technology winners”; the case remains for coal with 
CCS and even more for nuclear on the European energy agenda.   
•  The complexity of combining RES policy with EU market principles remains a critical issue. 
Experience shows that RES success stories have been based largely on national promotional 
policy. But how can we achieve market integration and establish RES trading if we cannot 
harmonize national RES support schemes? NRA’s usually don’t have a role in RES.  
•  Is trade and cost-effectiveness what we want, or the best solution and technology in the long 
run? High volume deployment and long term subsidy schemes do not go well together, and 
public authorities should not pick winners. What if market failure persists and there is a risk of 
not meeting our RES goals? How can we solve the RES/market discrepancy with better policy? 
Attention to the third pillar of security of supply has gained new momentum following the Russia-
Ukraine gas crises and oil price volatility, with discussion concentrated on the following issues.  Jean-Michel Glachant, Robert Grant, Manfred Hafner, and Jacques de Jong 
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•  The policy focus is primarily on gas, but the EU is not able to provide demand security for its 
external suppliers. There are policy and regulatory uncertainties, basically with regard to gas-
for-power, due to RES-policies and instruments as well as to coal/CCS and nuclear energy.  
•  Similar uncertainties concern Russia’s gas production. Russia needs huge investment to keep up 
current export levels, with production from current fields projected to be halved. The EU is 
Russia’s banker.  There is strong incentive to build Nabucco as it puts Russian gas supply into a 
more competitive environment. The gas glut over the next 3-5 years will give the EU an easy 
ride as the US benefits from shale gas.  
•  How can we create a competitive market in Europe that will provide greater market incentives 
for our main suppliers? What price are we willing to pay for security of supply? How can 
Europe shape the incentives for needed infrastructure and gas storage?   
•  Local context and development needs should be taken into account for external projects, 
whether solar energy  from North Africa or gas from Central Asia. Solar power from the Sahara 
is needed to meet regional demand growth, and diverting this supply to the EU risks energy neo-
colonialism.  
•  On gas, simply put, if Nabucco fails, diversification of supply is out of reach for Eastern Europe. 
Old and new MS are not in same position; the 2006 gas crisis lasted only 3 days, while the 2009 
one continued for three weeks and took on a its own momentum. But who is going to pay for  
pipelines that are not economically viable, and for the energy security of others?  
•  What is at the core of the EU-Russia relationship? Interdependency with Russia is fine, but 
Russia needs the EU more than vice versa. The EU focus is on the consumer; in Russia it is on 
the state. The first step needed is to restore mutual confidence. Ukraine is too big to fail and we 
might need to pay to stabilise it.  
•  Be smart on shaping foreign energy policy, as extending the EU’s internal principles will bring 
us only so far. Lisbon provides a step forward and new opportunities. On energy it implies a 
need for balancing top-down (political) and bottom-up (technical) approaches. But we need 
more transparency on bilateral deals. The EU is usually good at taking initiatives but not at 
selling them abroad. Be modest also as governments do not buy gas themselves.  
VII. Let’s go smart: a new vision and 22 recommendations 
Finally, based on a concluding session discussing a set of recommendations for a smart EU Energy 
Policy, the following proposals were formulated:  
1. A new vision 
1.  Develop a new integrated energy policy vision that moves beyond 2020. 
¾  Consider policy-organising principles such as a 2050 zero carbon objective for the overall EU 
energy mix.  
2. Integration and coordination 
•  2-1 Enhance internal policy coordination and consistency between the internal market, the 
external supply dimension and the needs of the low/zero carbon transition process.  
¾  Approach global energy issues in the wider context of the “energy/food/water” resource 
challenge.  
¾  Make integrated energy policy making within the Commission a “Chef-Sache”, i.e. a 
responsibility for the highest level, make it a single European Parliament committee 
responsibility and make it also a single track in Council decision making. Toward a Smart EU Energy Policy: Rationale and 22 Recommendations 
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•  2-2 Develop, in cooperation with the International  Energy Agency (IEA), a comprehensive 
overall Energy Market monitoring system that reports regularly on EU relevant energy 
market developments. 
¾  In line with the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the EU should prepare 
comprehensive bi-annual energy outlooks for the next 10-15 years in order to facilitate energy 
strategies for market parties and policy makers.  
•  2-3 Develop a systematic review process for supply security standards. 
¾  As there are no objective criteria for assessing “supply security” (as there are in climate issues 
and in competitiveness), make use of academic studies to start a discussion on it.   
3. Energy Policy Governance 
•  3-1 Make adequate use of the new legal basis for comprehensive and integrated EU energy 
policymaking. 
•  3-2 Allow willing Member States to carry out regional European energy policy making and 
initiatives, while still preserving overall EU consistency. 
¾  Examples of other policy areas could be useful, such as the euro-group, the Schengen-
arrangement, and the Pentalateral Forum.  
4. The energy efficiency dimension 
•  4-1 Continue EU Action Plans and make them binding wherever effective. 
¾  Label consumer goods such as large household appliances, lightning, and tyres.  
¾  Develop policies for the building sector to encompass, inter alia, efficient heating/cooling 
devices as well as energy efficiency norms and standards for houses, office buildings, and 
apartments.  
¾  Facilitate and promote decentralised (RES and/or gas based) generation options, including 
aspects of system integration, infrastructures and governance (Smart City platforms).  
•  4-2 Consider the development of white certificate market models at EU-level. 
¾  Due account shall be taken of successful deployment in some Member States.  
•  4-3 Consider the needs for an EU-policy approach on the deployment of smart metering and 
other demand side management measures for gas and electricity.  
¾  The relevant obligations emanating from the 2009 Gas and Electricity Directives need more 
precise interpretation.  
¾  European and other stakeholder platforms for smart metering are to play a role whenever 
appropriate.  
•  4-4 Develop a coherent vision and strategy for the transport sector.  
¾  The role of electric vehicles, especially when based on low carbon energy sources, in all 
segments of the transport sector to be assessed, including their potential, their operational 
needs, and their impact on areas such as infrastructure, scarce minerals, and rare earth 
compounds such as lithium.  
¾  In addition, trains, boats and planes will have to be included. 
5. The low-carbon dimension 
•  5-1 Strengthen the effectiveness of carbon emission mitigation mechanisms within the EU. Jean-Michel Glachant, Robert Grant, Manfred Hafner, and Jacques de Jong 
10 
¾  As ETS is necessary but not sufficient, strengthen its impact on low carbon technology 
options, further enhance market transparency, and organise effective market monitoring at 
EU-level.  
¾  Consider mechanisms for boosting investor confidence in stable long-term carbon price 
developments beyond 2020.  
¾  Emission performance standards for relevant point sources to be seen as a useful additional 
obligation to the ETS.  
¾  Introduce a CCS-obligation for new coal plants commissioned after 2015, in order to boost 
timely development of this technology.    
•  5-2 Create a level playing field for all relevant low or zero carbon technology options for 
power generation. 
¾  Review government support mechanisms, including innovation supporting feed-in tariffs, and 
make them non-discriminatory between technologies. 
¾  Consider a separate Schengen-like mechanism for nuclear energy technology deployment, 
giving due account to enhanced safety requirements.  
¾  Consider mechanisms to provide government guarantees for risky investments, and 
government insurance schemes for unforeseen delays in licensing procedures, with a view to 
enhance long term investor assurances for all low carbon technologies and their enabling 
infrastructures. 
•  5-3 Develop a more pro-active EU-role with regard to the development of nuclear energy in 
the fuel mix. 
¾  Develop policy arrangements for final disposal of high-level waste, including the option for 
shared facilities. 
¾  Promote full and open cooperation between national safety authorities on licensing new 
nuclear power plants. 
¾  Develop a transparent and confidence-building policy on the independent management of 
waste and decommissioning funds.  
¾  Consider options for strengthening the role of the Euratom Supply Agency in the context of 
the forthcoming Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference and other international 
fora for promoting nuclear fuel supply security under non-proliferation safeguards.     
•  5-4 Develop a view on the EU fuel mix, while respecting national sovereignty. 
¾  Such a view is needed as a basis for coordinating EU funding for new technologies, including 
the Strategic Energy Technology Plan. 
¾  Develop an EU-wide methodology and data exchange for planning new infrastructure, 
especially grids, including at regional levels, on the basis of different energy technology 
scenarios.  
6. The infrastructure dimension 
•  6-1 Re-regulate new internal cross border infrastructure (gas and electricity) and create 
incentives for new investment.  
¾  Start rethinking the prevailing regulatory designs for new infrastructure, in order to allow a 
more robust and cost-effective system with appropriate investor and user assurances.  
¾  The role of long-term transmission contracts in this context will have to be enhanced, 
including options for customized practices taking due account of competition policy. 
¾  Develop a consistent and incentive-based EU framework for building and operating non-
regulated, i.e. merchant lines as a further effective facilitator for market opening. Toward a Smart EU Energy Policy: Rationale and 22 Recommendations 
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•  6-2 Develop a clear vision and road map for large-scale infrastructure expansion to 
accommodate large RES-based power generation, coupled with a further expansion of 
demand side management smart metering and smart grid devices.  
¾  Such a Road Map should include impacts on system operations in an increasingly integrating 
market environment and a rethinking of the business models for the TSO’s.  
7. The single market dimension 
•  7-1 Coordinate regional market integration. 
¾  Develop an effective EU mechanism to assure coherency and consistency all along the value 
chain down to balancing markets; such a mechanism should comprise a clear reference model 
together with effective political governance arrangements.  
•  7-2 Be more explicit and robust on ACER, the new Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators.  
¾  Allow ACER to organise an explicit, effective and transparent role for itself in relation to the 
various regional initiatives.    
¾  ACER should have as its prime objective promoting the development of a strong and reliable 
energy infrastructure.  
¾  Explore under present regulation the possibilities for ACER to be more proactive in 
strengthening investor confidence for new energy infrastructure.     
¾  ACER should monitor the role of the energy exchanges in the management of cross-border 
interconnections.  
¾  Organise, locate, and finance ACER in such a way that it will become the final decision-
making authority for the EU Network Codes.  
8. The external dimension 
•  8-1 Develop a consistent vision and strategy vis-à-vis external suppliers. 
¾  On market access and reciprocity issues, create level playing fields. 
¾  On supply-demand dialogues, enhance transparency and understandings on all drivers that 
influence future supply and demand developments.   
•  8-2 Be smart with Russia.  
¾  Develop an “all-energy partnership” approach on the basis of fairness and effectiveness, with 
mutual benefits and interests.  
¾  Consider a pragmatic rethink of the Energy Charter Treaty process, for instance by 
reconvening the Energy Charter Conference.  
•  8-3 Be smart on “single voices”.  
¾  Organise “common voices” in a pragmatic way. 
¾  Use the external trade paradigm by making a distinction between trade policy and trade 
promotion. 
¾  Develop a coordination and information mechanism for bilateral actions, arrangements and 
contracts. 
•  8-4 Facilitating external gas supplies. 
¾  On infrastructure: do not pick winners, but rethink regulatory approaches in order to maximise 
internal cross border impact.  Jean-Michel Glachant, Robert Grant, Manfred Hafner, and Jacques de Jong 
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¾  On long-term arrangements: consider demand-aggregating mechanisms (Caspian 
Development Corporation, single buyer; but also consider response producers) and be smart 
on internal market competition versus external monopolies or cartels.  
•  8-5 Seek global energy dialogues. 
¾  With the Atlantic Basin, and in particular with the US, Canada and Brazil. 
¾  Enhance the existing EU-OPEC dialogue, focusing on technical issues and deepening 
understanding of global oil market developments.  
¾  With Asia, focus on China, India, Japan and Korea, enhancing further global energy 





Loyola de Palacio Professor in European Energy Policy and Director of Florence School of Regulation 
Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies, EUI 
Villa Malafrasca 
Via Boccaccio, 151 








BN44 3DZ  
Email: robert.grant@wiltonpark.org.uk 
 
Manfred Hafner  
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 
Corso Magenta, 63 
20123 Milano (Italy) 
Email: manfred.hafner@feem.it 
 
Jacques de Jong 
CLINGENDAEL INTERNATIONAL ENERGY PROGRAMME 
P.O. Box 93080 
2509 AB, The Hague 
Telephone: +31(70) 374 66 16 
Fax: +31(70) 374 66 88 
www.clingendael.nl/ciep   
Email: jjong@clingendael.nl  
  
 
 